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The Argentine social security system has been modified a number of  times 
since its creation in 1904. The pay-as-you-go system was adopted in 1954.  The 
reform of  1969 established the system’s definitive structure, which remained 
substantially unchanged for more than twenty years. However, the system’s 
underlying financial problems led the government to undertake an integral re- 
form of its social security program in 1993. The government adopted a mixed 
system by introducing  private pensions into the program. In this report,  former 
system or old system will refer to the retirement program that existed between 
1969 and 1993. 
The former pay-as-you-go system included a single regime for public- and 
private-sector employees and a separate regime for the self-employed (whose 
affiliation to the social security program is mandatory in Argentina). In theory, 
more than 90 percent of the labor force was insured under these two systems, 
with exclusions made only for state and local government employees, armed 
and  security  forces,  and  certain  professionals  with  independent  retire- 
ment systems. However, owing to pervasive evasion, especially among the 
self-employed, many workers were not eligible for benefits on reaching retire- 
ment age. 
The former system was funded with payroll taxes and, when necessary, with 
other forms of taxation. The government was exclusively responsible for its 
administration. Future benefits were predefined, but the actual link between 
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the amounts of contributions and benefits was very weak. This was especially 
true when the system’s financial problems became particularly serious and ben- 
eficiaries had to accept lower than anticipated pensions. 
To receive an old age pension, public and private employees had to attain a 
specified retirement age (sixty for men and fifty-five for women) and make 
contributions for a minimum period. In practice, however, excessive permis- 
siveness in the system allowed some workers to obtain pensions without accu- 
mulating the required contributions. Conditions of eligibility for disability and 
survivorship pensions were also lax. 
In theory, the pension formulas for dependent workers were extremely gen- 
erous by international standards and were linked to wages received during the 
last years of service. However, the methodology used to index pension benefits 
allowed distortion of  the relation, and this happened for decades of high in- 
flation.‘ 
Typically, there was little connection between workers’ past wages and their 
pension entitlements under the old system. There was also very little connec- 
tion  between their  years of  covered employment  and  their pension entitle- 
ments. These factors contributed to the creation of  undesirable labor market 
incentives and significant redistribution effects that were generally capricious. 
The cost of the pay-as-you-go system increased dramatically over time as a 
result of demographic and other factors. To cope with this problem, the govern- 
ment raised payroll taxes and earmarked other tax revenues for the system. In 
1993, the year of the reform that introduced private pension funds, the payroll 
tax rate was 26 percent. In addition, the system received 10 percent of total 
VAT  collection, 20 percent of  income tax collection, 100 percent of the per- 
sonal tax on wealth, 30 percent of all capital revenues obtained by the federal 
government from the sale of public enterprises, and the entire surplus of  the 
family allowances program funded by an additional payroll tax. Currently, so- 
cial security expenditures represent 6 percent of GDP, almost as much as the 
consolidated expenditure of the central government and its decentralized agen- 
cies, including transfers to public enterprises and to the private sector. 
The financial position of the social security system began to deteriorate in 
the 1980s. The crisis became so severe that the government declared a state of 
emergency and rescheduled the debt of the system to avoid a total collapse of 
the system. In 1993, the Argentine Congress sanctioned new legislation to cre- 
ate a mixed system based on the coexistence of private pensions and individual 
retirement accounts and the pay-as-you-go institutional arrangement (Schul- 
thess and Demarco 1994). 
The purpose of this report is to analyze the factors that led to the 1993 re- 
form (sec. 5.1) and describe the principal characteristics of the new system 
(sec. 5.2). In section 5.3, we examine some results of the new social security 
1.  The Social Security Department developed its own wage index for the purpose of  adjusting 
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system by observing the evolution of a group of global indicators. Finally, in 
section 5.4, we make inferences about the macroeconomic effects of the pen- 
sion funds on variables such as the public budget and the savings rate. 
5.1  Factors Leading Up to the Reform of the Social Security System 
The social security system’s reform was the response of the government to 
the financial crisis that had been building for many years. One clear manifesta- 
tion of  the deteriorating  financial position  of  the system was the extremely 
low level of  benefits paid (as compared to the legal targets) and the growing 
indebtedness with beneficiaries. The financial problems were not merely the 
result of inefficient administration but reflected, to a large extent, fundamental 
institutional weaknesses that ultimately threatened the solvency of the system. 
The growing number of  lawsuits brought against the system throughout the 
1980s  revealed its vulnerability to legal challenges regarding benefit levels and 
undermined the ability of the government to administer the system with avail- 
able resources. 
The situation was complicated by  increasing evidence of  the inequities of 
the system, which were as much the result of general pension legislation as of 
special laws introduced to benefit some segments of the labor force. In short, 
when the government submitted legislation to initiate a profound reform of the 
social security retirement program, it was clear that the financial problems of 
the system were just one of many factors contributing to the crisis. We will 
address each of these factors in turn. 
5.1.1  Chronic Financial Disequilibria 
The financial problems of the system resulted from trends in labor market 
demographics, payroll tax evasion, and structural problems inherent in the pay- 
as-you-go system. To  better understand the financial implications of  the pay- 
as-you-go system, it is useful to analyze the following condition for financial 
equilibrium: 
(1)  Aaw(1 - e) + T  = Bbw’, 
where A = number of contributors, a = payroll tax rate, w = average wage, 
e = rate of evasion, T = resources from the national Treasury (including ear- 
marked taxes), B = number of beneficiaries, b = replacement rate, and w’  = 
pensionable wage (i.e., reference wage to determine pensions). 
The left-hand side of equation (1) corresponds to the revenues of the system, 
and the right-hand side represents its outlays. If we express T as a proportion 
of payroll taxes, 
(2)  T  = .raAw(l - e), 
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(3)  ad(1 - e)(l + T)(w/w’)  = b. 
Equation (3) indicates that the replacement rate (b)  increases with the pay- 
roll tax rate (a),  the dependency ratio (d =  AIB), defined as the potential num- 
ber of contributors to pensioners, the amount of earmarked taxes, and the ratio 
between the current average wage and the pensionable wage and decreases 
with the rate of evasion. Variable e measures evasion as a proportion of poten- 
tial payroll tax collection.2 
Parameters involved in (3) are consistent if the equation is verified. For the 
values for d, a, (wIw’),  and e approximate to those in Argentina before the 
reform, consistency would require an enormous increase in resources from 
the national Treasury, which should be 2.2 times the payroll taxes to guarantee 
the level of b promised by the law (b = .70). Alternatively, with the amount of 
resources from the Treasury actually available (T = .33), b should shrink to 
.29, a level rejected by Argentine society. 
Changes in other parameters could certainly have helped, but, as we  shall 
see, tendencies appeared to worsen these results. 
Dependency Rate (d) 
There has been a steady decline in the dependency ratio in Argentina before 
the social security reform as labor market demographics changed, conditions 
governing the extension of benefits became lax, and evasion increased. 
Population aging is a well-known phenomenon that occurs as a consequence 
of economic development. During the first phases, it derives from a decline in 
birth rates parallel to an increase in life expectancy. Figure 5.1 illustrates that 
this phenomenon has occurred in Argentina. It is important to state that popula- 
tion aging is not a mere “transition problem”: developed economies increas- 
ingly improve health and life conditions, thus increasing the proportion of old 
persons in total population. This is a leading reason why pay-as-you-go social 
security systems’ financial problems are so generalized all over the world. 
The primary effect of population aging on these systems is realized through 
a decline in the dependency ratio. Table 5.1 illustrates the projected depen- 
dency rate by  extrapolating from actual demographic trends observed in the 
period preceding the 1993 reform. As illustrated, this rate was insufficient to 
meet the requirement for financial equilibrium even in the initial period. More- 
over, the parameter declines throughout time, exacerbating the financial prob- 
lems of the system even further. 
In addition to demographic tendencies, excess permissiveness in the admin- 
istration of benefits contributed to lowering the dependency rate. This was par- 
ticularly clear in the case of  disability and survivorship pensions (table 5.2), 
2.  Parameter e reflects  just part of total evasion. In fact, evasion can affect revenues by lowering 
the number of  contributors (A) or the amount contributed (nw).  This has been a common form of 
payroll tax evasion in Argentina, where workers and firms have typically underdeclared wage in- 
comes. 181  The Shift to a Funded Social Security System in Argentina 
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Fig. 5.1  Percentage of elderly population 
Source: Superintendencia de AFP, Unidad de Estudios Econdmicos y Estadisticas. 
Table 5.1  Projected Dependency Ratio (thousands of persons) 
Total Equivalent  Dependency 
Years  Contributors  Pensions"  Ratio 
1990  1,890  2,944  1.66 
1995  5,260  3,447  1.53 
2000  5,663  3,765  1.50 
2010  6,654  4,339  1.53 
2020  7,723  4,964  1.56 
Source: Lo Vuolo (1994). 
"Each survivorship pension is equivalent to 0.70 of  a retirement pension. 
Table 5.2  Survivorship and Disability Pensions (thousands of persons) 
1980  780  187  2,342  41.3 
1985  95 1  302  2,743  45.7 
1990  1,124  523  3,110  53.0 
1991  1,141  525  3,204  52.0 
Source: Schulthess and Demarco (1993). 
noncontributory  pensions  (pensiones graciables), and  special  regimes  for 
privileged sectors (characterized by higher benefits and less strict conditions 
for eligibility), which rose from 51 percent of total cases in 1975 to 56 percent 
in 1992 and from 39 percent of total expenditures to 49 percent. 
Average Salary/Best Salary Proportion (wfw') 
In many countries, this variable is higher than one due to increases in labor 
productivity. In Argentina, however, annual productivity growth was negative 182  Joaquin Cottani and Gustavo Demarco 
between 1974 and 1990. Moreover, pay-as-you-go benefits were based on the 
individual’s highest remuneration, not  on  average wages  during the active 
years.3  As a result, w/w’  was typically lower than one, thus affecting the equi- 
librium equation. In addition, benefits defined as a proportion of best last sala- 
ries (and not to average) favored a form of evasion consisting in underdeclaring 
salaries during an important part of active life. 
Evasion (e) 
Since contributions made in years other than the last ten had no effect on 
benefit levels, young workers were particularly averse to complying with legal 
contribution levels. These factors, combined with the extremely high payroll 
tax that finances social security programs, explain the observed tendency to- 
ward evasion that is realized in the form of total or partial omission of contribu- 
tions? According to available data presented in table 5.3, evasion exceeded 40 
percent of potential collections, on average, during the period 1980-92. 
Evasion is partially a consequence of  underdeclaration of  wages and also 
one of illegal employment. One can infer the magnitude of the last by examin- 
ing the evolution of informal employment. There is clear evidence that infor- 
mal employment became more important in Argentina in the period preceding 
the 1993 reform since the share of employment in the personal and social ser- 
vices sector increased from 20 to 33 percent between  1960 and  1990. The 
increase in the share of the labor force employed in low-productivity activities 
had a negative effect on the financial position of the system since evasion is 
more pervasive among self-employed workers. 
In summary, the factors analyzed in this section explain why Argentina’s 
social security system developed financial problems in the years leading up to 
the reform. The tendencies observed during the period demonstrate clearly that 
the necessary conditions for financial equilibrium were already absent in the 
1980s. 
The data contained in table 5.4 reflect the financial structure of the social 
security system. As  illustrated, the  system  relied  increasingly on external 
sources of  financing and transferred its financial difficulties to the national 
budget. Table 5.5 illustrates the evolution of  social security revenues and ex- 
penditures prior to the reform. As observed, even the addition of Treasury re- 
sources was insufficient to reverse the basic trend toward financial disequi- 
libria. 
3.  For  salaried workers, the former legislation defined highest  remuneration as the highest 
three-year average remuneration received during the last ten-year period in the worker’s active 
work life. 
4. In addition to pensions, payroll taxes fund four other social insurance programs: health insur- 
ance for active workers, health insurance for pensioners, family allowances, and unemployment 
insurance. Total contributions under the former regime were 33 percent for employers and  16 
percent for workers, raising the overall payroll tax to 49 percent of wages. 183  The Shift to a Funded Social Security System in Argentina 
Table 5.3  Evasion of the Argentine Social Security System (% of 
potential collections) 
Employees 
Public  Private 
Year  Sector  Sector  Total  Self-Employed  Total 
1980  58.3  49.5  50.5  44.3  50.1 
1985  44.7  37.8  38.5  63.0  39.7 
1991  30.5  53.9  53.0  65.5  53.8 
1992  35.0  46.9  46.6  74.2  49.1 
Source: Durin (1993). 
Table 5.4  Financing the Social Security System (%) 
Own  Earmarked  National Treasury 
Years  Resources  Taxes  and Central Bank  Total 
1975  79.6  .3  20.1  100 
1980  85.1  10.6  4.3  1  00 
1985  74.3  15.9  9.8  100 
1990  65.8  21.8  12.4  100 
1991  74.2  15.9  9.9  100 
Source: Schulthess and Demarco (1993). 
Table 5.5  Revenues and Expenditures of the Social Security System 
(million pesos) 
1975  1980  1985  1990  1991 
~~  ~ 
Revenues  8,016  11,694  10,737  9,241  10,384 
Own revenues  7,984  9,955  6,715  7,366  8,302 
Other  32  1,739  4,022  1,875  2,082 
Expenditures  10,130  11,674  9,940  9,963  9,668 
Net (revenues minus expenditures)  -2,114  20  797  -722  716 
Source: Schulthess and Demarco (1993). 
5.1.2  Debt with Pensioners 
Growing financial difficulties and natural limitations on the extent to which 
the deficits of  the system could be financed with tax revenues prompted the 
government to lower the pensions paid to beneficiaries through an “adequate” 
manipulation of  benefit adjustment indexes. The result was that the replace- 
ment rate promised by law (70-82  percent of  the best wage) was systematically 184  Joaquin Cottani and Gustavo Demarco 
violated. The subsequent legal challenges to the constitutionality of the prac- 
tice ended in the system’s “indebtedness crisis.” 
Between 1991 and 1992, the government consolidated all the system’s debts 
with pensioners. The government canceled its debts with pensioners partially 
with cash and partially with bonds (BOCON). The total amount of debt recog- 
nized by the system through the consolidation process reached U.S.$12.5 bil- 
lion. The government also used resources it received from the privatization of 
the national oil company, YPF, to cancel part of  the bonds it had issued to 
cancel the system’s debts. 
Notwithstanding the special factors that contributed to restoring equilibrium 
to the system during the period 1991-93,  the continuing inconsistency among 
the pay-as-you-go arrangements’ basic parameters threatened to destabilize the 
system again. The traumatic consequences of managing such an enormous debt 
burden strengthened other arguments in favor of an integral reform of the so- 
cial security system. 
5.1.3  Inequities 
Apart from its financial weaknesses, the pay-as-you-go system exhibited ex- 
treme inequities in the allocation of benefits. As mentioned earlier, special re- 
gimes proliferated and introduced marked differences in the criteria used to 
extend benefits to particular workers. For example, public-sector employees 
generally received more generous pensions than private-sector employees. The 
practice of applying different adjustment procedures to different pensions pro- 
duced inequities and also led to settlements in favor of  workers that brought 
lawsuits against the system. The settlements typically included provisions to 
apply adjustment procedures that were even more generous than those pro- 
vided for in the general legislation. In some cases, maximum legal pensions 
were exceeded. 
The general pension legislation itself was a source of inequity since an indi- 
vidual’s benefit rate was completely divorced from the effort he or she made to 
contribute to the system. As a result, two similarly paid workers who contrib- 
uted to the system during a different number of  years could receive similar 
benefits in retirement. 
The inequity effects of the pay-as-you-go system can be quantified by com- 
paring the internal rate of  return of  the social security system of the general 
and special regimes. We estimated the corresponding IRR.5  In spite of the addi- 
tional contributions of 2 percent of the salary, special regimes yielded benefits 
that exceeded those of the general regime by 66 percent in the case of men (5.8 
5. The IRR were calculated on the basis of estimated contributions during the active working 
life and projected benefits during retirement. Greater detail on the methodology used can be found 
in Schulthess (1991) and in Demarco and Posadas (1992). 185  The Shift to a Funded Social Security System in Argentina 
percent per year vs. 3.5 percent in the general case) and by  30 percent in the 
case of women (8.0 vs. 6.1 percent). 
5.1.4  Effect on Saving 
The effects of private pensions on saving constitute an additional argument 
for the reform of social security. Owing to its low internal saving rate, Argenti- 
na’s growth is crucially dependent on foreign savings, its economy being thus 
exposed to great instability as a consequence of fluctuations in variables affect- 
ing financial markets. Long-run reduction in social security’s public deficit and 
the development of  an institutional capital market would certainly contribute 
to self-sustainable economic growth. 
The poor growth performance of Argentina in the 1980s was closely associ- 
ated with a decline in gross domestic investment relative to GDP, from 25.3 
percent in 1980 to 14 percent in  1990. During the same period, the national 
saving rate decreased from 23.3 to 18.6 percent. Although the investment rate 
picked up in 1991 and 1992, reaching 16.7 percent in 1992, this was entirely 
due to an increase in  foreign saving since the saving rate decreased to  14.3 
percent in  1992. Thus, net capital inflows financed not  only an increase in 
investment but also an increase in consumption, raising doubts about the ca- 
pacity of the economy to generate foreign exchange to maintain external sol- 
vency in the long run. 
The debate over the current account deficit, which reached 2.4 percent of 
GDP in 1992, helped the government push the reform of the social security 
system by arguing that such a reform would have a positive effect on the na- 
tional saving rate, thereby reducing dependency on foreign saving. To substan- 
tiate this argument, the government committed itself to maintaining in  1993, 
1994, and 1995 the same consolidated primary budget surplus that had been 
attained in  1992 (i.e., 1.5 percent of  GDP), in spite of  the shift of  funds that 
would materialize once the social security reform was implemented. The gov- 
ernment was confident that this result was possible because of the reduction in 
payroll tax evasion that would follow the reform. 
The three-year (1993-95)  fiscal program was supported by  the IMF under 
the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) $4.0 billion Extended Fund Facility, How- 
ever, owing to the complexity of the reform and the extensive discussions that 
followed, Congress did not approve the law until October 1993. Moreover, the 
reform was not implemented until July 1994. 
5.2  The Rules of the New System 
The system, called the integrated system of retirement and pensions (SIJP), 
is a mixed program consisting of a public pay-as-you-go institutional arrange- 
ment and an individual retirement account program known as the capitalization 
regime (CR). All workers eighteen years of age or older are required to partici- 186  Joaquin Cottani and Gustavo Demarco 
pate in the system. Employees of the armed and security forces, state and local 
governments, and certain professionals with independent retirement systems 
are not obligated to participate.6 
Individuals are free to choose whether they affiliate with the CR or the pay- 
as-you-go regime. The so-called private pension regime is not purely private 
since the government intervenes in some aspects of its administration. 
The SIJP is financed through statutory contributions paid by employees and 
their employers. The employee contribution is  11 percent and the employer 
contribution 16 percent.’ In the case of  self-employed workers, a 27 percent 
contribution rate is applied to a schedule of reference incomes to calculate the 
individual’s statutory contribution. The reference for these workers is not their 
actual income but rather an estimated income level. 
The pay-as-you-go regime is financed with (a)  the payroll tax paid by  em- 
ployers, (6)  the contributions of employees who are affiliated with the system, 
and (c)  earmarked taxes and funds provided by the public budget. The capital- 
ization regime is funded by the individual’s statutory contributions, any volun- 
tary contributions made by the affiliates or by persons or firms to the affiliate’s 
account based on a prior agreement with the affiliate, and indemnifications 
paid by life insurance companies in the event of disability or death.8 
The public pay-as-you-go regime extends benefits to pensioners under the 
old system and also to affiliates of  the two regimes under the new  system. 
The benefits for the new system are (a)  the basic universal pension (PBU), (b) 
the compensatory pension (PC), (c) additional pension for permanence (PAP), 
and (4  survivorship  and disability pensions. The basic universal pension (PBU) 
is a redistributive (minimum) elderly pension; affiliates of any regime who have 
contributed to the system for thirty years or more are eligible at sixty-five years 
of  age.9 The compensatory pension (PC) is also a pension for those elderly 
individuals who meet the criteria for the PBU and who have also contributed 
to the old previsional system. The additional pension for permanence (PAP) is 
a pension for individuals who are eligible to receive a PBU and who chose to 
remain in the pay-as-you-go system after the new system was established. 
Under the capitalization regime, affiliates may be eligible for a PBU and 
also for a PC, but the PAP is replaced by an ordinary retirement pension (JO) 
based on the accumulation of  personal contributions made to individual ac- 
counts managed by  private pension fund managers called AFJPs. After com- 
6. State and local governments may participate in the SIJP if they choose to. To  date, six of 
twenty-three state governments and the municipal government of Buenos Aires have subscribed to 
the system. Subscription by these governments to the SIJP involves the transference of the local 
pension regimes to the national regime and the obligatory participation by all personnel employed 
in these governments in the SIJP. 
7. The employers’ contribution was recently reduced in variable proportions according to dif- 
ferent geographic regions. 
8. Although not the only way, employers’ voluntary contributions represent one way to channel 
bonuses or profit sharing to the employees. 
9. Women can retire five years earlier than men. 187  The Shift to a Funded Social Security System in Argentina 
missions have been  deducted, the contributions to individuals’ accounts are 
invested in assets and capitalized together with the profits that are obtained 
by  investing the funds. The individual retirement account can be increased 
through voluntary contributions. 
Affiliates with the capitalization regime may begin to draw on their assets 
at the age of  sixty-five (men) or sixty (women). Individuals may  choose to 
purchase annuities with their accounts or to receive programmed periodic pay- 
ments (“programmed withdrawals”) until the account is exhausted. In the event 
of disability or death, the AFJP must draw on a collective life and disability 
insurance policy to add to the capital accumulated in the individual’s retirement 
account until there are sufficient funds to generate a defined-benefit pension. 
5.2.1  Pension Fund Managers (AFJP) 
The AFJPs are private or public companies created for the exclusive purpose 
of investing affiliates’ contributions to their individual retirement accounts and 
administering payments to affiliates who choose to draw down their accounts 
through  scheduled withdrawals in retirement.  Current legislation  sets mini- 
mum requirements for the volume of capital and minimum reserve require- 
ments that must be held. 
The AFJP is the primary institution with which current workers affiliate. The 
AFJP remains the primary institution during the worker’s retirement years if 
the individual retirement account is drawn down through programmed with- 
drawals. The AFJP is responsible for investing its affiliates’ retirement funds, 
for guaranteeing the statutory minimum return on these investments, and for 
providing supplementary capital when necessary for affiliates who are disabled 
or die before retirement. Individuals cannot be affiliated with more than one 
AFJP, but they may change AFJPs up to two times per year after making four 
consecutive monthly contributions to a single AFJP. 
5.2.2  Pension Funds 
The pension fund is composed of the affiliates’ statutory and voluntary con- 
tributions plus preconvened deposits, less commissions, plus profits earned by 
investing the funds. The fund is the property  of the affiliates and is legally 
separated from the capital constituted by the AFJP. The legal separation is nec- 
essary to isolate the AFJP’s financial position from the pension fund and to 
protect the fund if  the AFJP goes into bankruptcy. Each AFJP manages just 
one pension fund, which consists of investing the funds accumulated through 
individual contributions and capital contributed by life insurance companies. 
The fund may be invested in a number of alternative financial instruments, 
such as government bonds, corporate bonds, time deposits, corporate stocks, 
shares in mutual funds, and mortgage-backed securities. There are legal limits 
on the percentage of the fund‘s total resources that may be invested in any one 
kind of instrument or in any single issuer. The supervisory body may also issue 
regulations to lower percentages below those set in the law. Table 5.6 illustrates 188  Joaquin Cottani and Gustavo Demarco 
Table 5.6  Pension Fund Investment Rules 
Assets 
Asset Ceiling 
(% of Portfolio) 
Securities issued by the national government 
Securities issued by provincial and local governments 
Long-term securities issued by domestic private corporations 
Short-term securities issued by domestic private corporations 
Certificates of deposit in local banks 
Domestic corporate shares 
Shares of recently privatized domestic public enterprises 
Domestic mutual investment funds 
Foreign corporate securities 











the structure of investments permitted together with the accompanying regula- 
tions. 
The profitability of a particular fund is measured as the percentage change 
in the value of  one share between two consecutive periods. Returns are not 
guaranteed in absolute terms, but each fund manager is required to produce a 
minimum investment return equivalent to 70 percent of the system's average 
return or 2 percentage points lower than the system's average, whichever is 
lower. Each AFJP must guarantee that affiliates earn at least the minimum re- 
turn by  using funds, when necessary, from (a)  the special fluctuation fund, 
(b)  minimum reserves required by  law  to be held by the AFJPs, and (c) the 
AFJP's own capital. 
The special fluctuation fund is constituted by  setting aside all profits that 
exceed by  30 percent the system-wide average return or 2 percentage points 
higher than the system average whenever the system average is positive, which- 
ever is greater. The minimum reserve requirement represents 2 percent of the 
fund's  assets and cannot be less than 3 million pesos (equivalent to U.S.$3 
million). 
5.2.3  Benefits 
The SUP covers contingencies for retirement, disability, and death. Retire- 
ment benefits vary depending on whether the worker has participated in the 
pay-as-you-go regime or in the capitalization regime. In either case, the total 
retirement pension has three components, two of which are common to both 
regimes and administered by the government. 
As mentioned previously, affiliates of the pay-as-you-go regime are eligible 
to receive the PBU, the PC, and the PAP. The PBU is a uniform and universal 
retirement benefit, approximately equivalent to 20 percent of the average salary 
economy-wide. It is not linked to individual wages. 
For a transition period, the government will pay the PC to workers affiliated 189  The Shift to a Funded Social Security System in Argentina 
with either regime when they demonstrate that they made contributions to the 
former pension system. In order to qualify for the PC, the worker must first 
qualify for the PBU. The PC is calculated as a percentage of  the average in- 
come received by the worker during the last ten years of  active employment. 
The percentage is equivalent to 1.5 percent for each year that the worker con- 
tributed to the former pension system. 
The PAP is a benefit that the government extends to all workers who choose 
to be affiliated with the pay-as-you-go regime after the social security reform. 
The requirements to receive the PAP are the same as those needed to receive 
the PBU. The PAP is calculated as a percentage of  the average income the 
worker received during the last ten years of active employment. The percentage 
is equal to 0.85 percent for each year that the worker contributes to the pay-as- 
you-go regime under the new system. 
Affiliates of the private pension regime are eligible to receive the PBU, the 
PC, and the ordinary retirement pension (JO). Affiliates who have reached 
sixty-five years of age in the case of men or sixty years of  age in the case of 
women may receive a JO, which is related to the amount they have available 
in their individual retirement accounts. The total amount available may be used 
to purchase an annuity, or the total may be depleted gradually through a pro- 
gram of scheduled withdrawals. Figure 5.2 illustrates the relation between the 
various components of retirement benefits. 
The PC was extended to smooth the transition between the former and the 
current retirement system while recognizing the contributions made under the 
former system. Once it disappears, retirement benefits will be consolidated 
into the PBU, which is the redistributive component of the system, and the JO. 
The PAP should also disappear over time since its implicit rate of  return is 
relatively low. 
The dependents of a worker who dies during his or her productive years are 
entitled to receive a survivorship pension, which is equivalent to a percentage 
of the worker’s average income received in the five years prior to death. Depen- 
State 
+  + 
Pension fund  4-1  I 
Pay-as-you-go regime  Capitalization regime 
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dents include the worker’s wife, husband, or partner, incapacitated children, or 
children who are minors. 
SIJP benefits are also extended to workers who become completely disabled 
at some time during their active working lives. The technical definition of com- 
plete incapacitation is 66 percent or greater. The disability benefit is equivalent 
to 70 percent of the average income earned during the five years prior to being 
declared incapacitated. 
During the two years’ transition period until the definitive disability is de- 
clared, the AFJP must pay the monthly disability benefit with funds provided 
by a life insurance company. Once the disability becomes definitive, the life 
insurance company must supply complementary funds to the individual retire- 
ment account until it is possible to purchase an annuity that generates the 
defined-benefit pension. 
5.2.4  Institutional Organization of the SIJP 
One significant difference between the new and the former social security 
system is the number of institutions involved in their administration. Under the 
former system, the government had a complete monopoly on the collection 
of funds, on the allocation and administration of benefits, and on the regulation 
of  a  single  social  security  system.  Currently,  different  institutions  are 
responsible for different functions. 
The Direcci6n General Impositiva (DGI), tax collection agency, is responsi- 
ble for collecting contributions to the pay-as-you-go as well as to the capital- 
ization regime.  Once the  funds  are  collected, the  DGI  transfers them  to 
the appropriate AFJP and to the government’s social security administration 
agency, the Administraci6n Nacional de la Seguridad Social (ANSES). Em- 
ployers’ contributions are also collected by the DGI, and the funds go to AN- 
SES, independent of the worker’s affiliation.  ANSES is a decentralized agency 
operating under the authority of the Social Security Department. It is responsi- 
ble for administering the benefits of individuals affiliated with the pay-as-you- 
go system. ANSES also administers other benefits extended by the social secu- 
rity system, such as unemployment payments, welfare pensions, and family al- 
lowances. 
As mentioned previously, the new system is a mixed one, so, even in the 
case of  workers who have chosen to affiliate with the capitalization regime, 
ANSES is responsible for the administration of  their PBU and PC. Finally, 
ANSES shares with the private pension funds the cost of disability or death 
insurance for workers who are affiliated with the capitalization regime and 
who were at least thirty years of age when the new system was adopted. 
By contrast, the capitalization regime is managed by a number of public and 
private institutions. To start, the AFJPs are responsible for investing individu- 
als’ contributions to the system. The Superintendency of the AFJP is the regu- 
latory body authorized to supervise the activities of  the AFJP. The superin- 
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Ministry of Labor and Social Security. It is responsible for the authorization of 
AFJPs, the supervision of  their activities, the imposition of  legal sanctions, 
and the liquidation of  an AFJP when necessary. The superintendency is also 
authorized to issue resolutions in areas that affect the functioning of the sys- 
tem, and it monitors the performance of the individual AFJP and the system 
by  controlling for the quality and accuracy of indicators of contributions, in- 
vestments, profitability, required reserves, and fluctuation funds, to name a few. 
There are other institutions that are not specifically part of the private pen- 
sion regime but are necessary for the development of the capital market, which 
is itself a necessary element of the regime. A couple of examples are the risk- 
rating agencies and such regulatory bodies as the National Securities Commis- 
sion. Insurance companies that offer life and retirement insurance are becom- 
ing very active as a consequence of the new regime, and they will grow in the 
future. Figure 5.3 summarizes the various institutions involved in the public 
pay-as-you-go regime as well as their specific functions. Figure 5.4 summa- 
rizes the institutional structure of the private pension regime. 
5.3  Evolution of the New Pension System 
The new pension system was established in July 1994 and has been func- 
tioning for three years. It would be difficult to undertake a complete evaluation 
of the system after such a short period. In the following sections, we focus on 
the recent evolution of some of its components. 
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5.3.1  Affiliation 
Table 5.7 provides information on the number of workers who chose to af- 
filiate with the capitalization regime and with the pay-as-you-go regime. As 
illustrated, between August 1994 and June  1997, there has been continuous 
growth in the number of  affiliations and in the share of  the private pension 
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Table 5.7  Affiliates of the Capitalization and Pay-as-You-Go  Regimes 
Affiliates (thousands)  Affiliates (70) 
Pay as  Total  Pay as 
Date as of  You Go  Capitalization  SIJP  You Go  Capitalization  Total 
September 1994  2,674  3,034  5,708  46.9  53.1  100.0 
December 1994  2,901  3,679  6,580  44.1  55.9  100.0 
June 1995  2,840  4,137  6,977  40.7  59.3  100.0 
December 1995  2,709  4.92 1  7,630  35.5  64.5  100.0 
June 1996  2,598  5,476  8,074  32.2  67.8  100.0 
December 1996  2,544  5,633  8,177  31.1  68.9  100.0 
June 1997  2,396  5,997  8,393  28.6  71.4  100.0 
Source:  Superintendencia de AFJP, Memoria trimestral(1994-97). 
Nore: “Capitalization” includes the National Fund of  Employment and the undecided. 
The growth trend is weakened if the rate of effective contributors to affiliates 
is analyzed during the same period. This variable tends to decline for both 
regimes during the period, and the decline is particularly pronounced in the 
case of the private pension regime. This phenomenon may be explained by the 
increase in unemployment observed during the period, the effect of the 1995 
recession on delaying contributions to the system, and the problem of irregular 
affiliations. Both unemployment and irregular forms of affiliation tend to affect 
the capitalization regime more markedly than the pay-as-you-go regime since 
affiliates in the capitalization regime are on average younger. 
Participation in the capitalization regime has been more important among 
formally employed workers than among the self employed, and this trend has 
increased through time. Even though the new  legislation requires the self- 
employed to participate, the AFJPs have been less aggressive in affiliating them 
since their contributions to the system are generally low and there is a greater 
tendency among the self-employed to evade contributions. 
Another interesting characteristic to consider is the composition of affiliates 
on the basis of their age and sex. There is a clear preference for the capitaliza- 
tion regime among young men, which is illustrated in figure 5.5. 
The concentration of  young male affiliates to the capitalization regime is 
explained by the greater benefits it offers this segment of the labor force. For 
younger workers, more time available to contribute to the system means that 
there will be greater expected benefit levels in retirement. Moreover, men, with 
lower life expectancy, have greater expected benefits for a given amount of 
capital than do women. 
5.3.2  Pension Fund Managers (AFJPs) 
Although eighteen AFJPs are actually operating, just four of them represent 
more than 60 percent of total affiliates in the capitalization regime, with collec- 
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Another important characteristic of the market for AFJPs is the composition 
of shareholder capital. Table 5.8 and figure 5.7 illustrate the composition of 
AFJP shareholder capital, dividing shareholders into banks, insurance compa- 
nies, unions, nonfinancial companies, and others. As illustrated, banks and in- 
surance companies represent almost 90 percent of total capital invested in the 
AFJPs. The union associations,  which are eligible to form their own AFJP 
directly, have invested only  5.2 percent of  the total amount invested in the 
AFJPs. Nonfinancial institutions have invested just 3.2 percent of the total. 
5.3.3  Pension Funds’ Investments and Profitability 
Since their creation, the private pension funds have been growing by more 
than 200 million pesos per month on average. By the end of June 1997, the 
total value of the retirement and pension funds represented more than 7.3 bil- 
lion pesos. 
The notable growth in the monthly fund totals is the result of the growth in 
the number of affiliates, which was discussed previously, and of the high rate 
of return realized on investments during the period analyzed. As illustrated in 
table 5.9 and figure 5.8, the funds accrued very favorable real returns on their 
investments throughout  1995. In fact, the extremely high annual returns re- 
corded at the end of 1995 and 1996 are explained by the comparison with low 
asset prices quoted after the 1994 Mexican crisis. Nonetheless, even the lowest 
rates earned in the months preceding the crisis were very high. 
Such high rates of return on fund assets are a consequence of the structure 
of fund portfolios. This information is illustrated in table 5.10. A striking fea- 
ture that emerges from the data is that changes in the structure of the portfolios 
had a very limited effect on returns. During the first two years of the period 
analyzed, investments were concentrated in fixed-income instruments such as 
government bonds and time deposits, while investments in variable-income 
instruments such as stocks were well below the legal limits permitted. Since 
Table 5.8  Capital Structure of the AFJP (June 1997) 
Millions 
of Pesos  % 
Banks  5,857.4  79.8 
Insurance companies  715.9  9.7 
Labor associations  380.6  5.2 
Nonfinancial companies  229.5  3.1 
Foreign pension funds  .o  ... 
Other  161.1  2.2 
Total  7,344.6  100.0 
Source: Superintendencia de AFJP, Memoriu trimestrul(1997). Non Financial Companies  Other 
2.2  3.1  Labor Associations 
- 
79.8 
Fig. 5.7  Capital structure of the AFJP (%) 
Source: Superintendencia de AFJP, Memoria trimestrul(1997). 
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Table 5.9  Average System Return (%) 
12-Month Period Ending 
July 1995  13.1 
September 1995  14.3 
December 1995  19.7 
March 1996  25.6 
June 1996  22.8 
September 1996  20.4 
December 1996  19.8 
March 1997  22.1 
June 1997  23.5 
Source: Superintendencia de AFJP,  Memoria trimestrul(l994-97). 
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Table 5.10  Percentage Distribution of Investment Portfolio by Type 
of Instrument 
Dec.  June  Dec.  June  Dec.  June 
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1.8  1.4 
52.7  49.3 
14.2  16.4 
18.7  21.8 
7.8  4.8 
2.3  4.1 
.2  .4 
2.3  1.8 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Source: Superintendencia de AFJP, Memoria trimesrral ( 1994-97) 
June 1996, however, an important substitution took place from time deposits 
to stocks (fig. 5.9). 
5.3.4  Commissions 
The commissions that the fund managers charge their affiliates are deter- 
mined freely. They include a charge for the collective life and disability insur- 
ance policy that each fund manager must maintain to confront the eventual 
contingencies discussed in previous sections. 
The level of commissions charged by various AFJPs is one indicator of their 
efficiency. If we observe the evolution of the system-wide average commission, 
separating out the portion of the fee charged for the life insurance premium 
and the administration cost, the most significant observation is the sharp reduc- 
tion in the average cost of collective life and disability insurance. With the 
improvement in information  on mortality rates, which were lower than ex- 
pected, insurance companies and the AFJPs were able to adjust the cost. 
The significant reduction in the insurance premium (from an average of 2.2 
percent of wages in July 1994 to 1.0 percent in June 1997) was not passed on 
to affiliates in the form of lower overall commissions. To the contrary, average 
commissions remained at a constant level of 3.3 percent of salaries between 
July 1994 and June 1997. 
This means that a significant increase in the part of the commission was 
used to finance the administration of  the fund managers. It may be the case 
that the low mortality rates produced a source of  financing to cover the high 
start-up costs of the AFJPs’ activities, which in many cases resulted from an 
overestimation of the size of the market. The mergers between companies that 
are taking place and the more austere commercial policies being adopted by 
the fund managers will be key to determining whether commissions will de- 













Fig. 5.9  Percentage distribution of investment portfolio by type of instrument 
(as of 30 June 1997) 
Source: Superintendencia de AFJP, Boletin rnensual(l997). 
5.3.5  Benefits 
It is difficult to evaluate the administration of benefits under the new system 
since its number is still quite low. Since most affiliates under the new private 
regime consist of young workers, most of the benefits that have been extended 
correspond to disability or survivorship pensions. 
The only remarkable fact in this regard is the important decrease in the ratio 
of disability pensions to total pensions as compared with the levels before the 
reform. This is important in explaining the low level of life and disability in- 
surance. 
5.3.6  Summary 
It  is  still difficult to evaluate the results of  the new  previsional system 
adopted by Argentina in  1993. The indicators analyzed in this section show, 
however, that Argentine society is increasingly accepting this alternative or- 
ganization of social security. An important growth in the number of affiliations 
confirms this. AFJPs are proving that they can administer pension funds effi- 
ciently, and insurance costs are surprisingly low. However, commissions still 
remain high. 
One can expect commissions to be reduced as the number of  affiliates (or 
the size of the fund administered) grows, increasing the return on investment. 
Mergers will certainly help, as will the government’s efforts to reduce evasion. 
In spite of the insufficiency of evidence, one can conclude that many of the 
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Time will confirm whether the new system provides better service to affiliates 
and beneficiaries. 
In  the next section, we focus on some macroeconomic effects of  pension 
funds. The most important for the Argentine economy are the effects on the 
public budget and on the national saving rate. 
5.4  The Effect of the New System on Saving 
Macroeconomic effects of social security reforms have become part of the 
discussion as  relevant  aspects to  consider when  introducing capitalization 
regimes (Uthoff 1995). One of the most discussed questions in this respect is 
the effect of pension funds on national saving. This has been an important con- 
cern in Argentina, a country characterized by a structurally low national saving 
rate and a strong macroeconomic exposure to fluctuations in international fi- 
nancial markets. It is our purpose, not to test theoretical hypotheses, but to 
examine probable empirical results from projections for the economy as a 
whole. 
The initial effect of  social security reform is to increase the government’s 
deficit since public social security expenditures will be reduced much more 
slowly than the payroll taxes collected by the state. The effect of the reform on 
saving will thus depend on the relative size of  the government’s deficit vis-2- 
vis the annual growth of the pension funds. We examine separately projections 
of  the public deficit and of  pension funds for the period  1995-2020  before 
concluding with a consideration of the expected net effect on private saving. 
5.4.1  Public Social Security Deficit 
When a pay-as-you-go system is replaced by  a capitalization regime, there 
will exist a period of  time in which the new  system coexists with benefits 
defined under the former regime. As a result, the government will have to fi- 
nance expenditures generated under the former regime with a smaller amount 
of resources, the result of the partial or total transfer of workers’ contributions 
to the capitalization regime. 
The transition period is defined as the period of time it takes until the former 
regime disappears. During the transition period, the financial pressures gener- 
ated by the shift in resources away from the pay-as-you-go regime will become 
even more pronounced. Even though the transition is temporary, it is important 
to have  an estimate of  the size and probable evolution of  the deficit and to 
adopt necessary corrective measures (Posadas 1994). 
It is necessary to analyze the evolution of the transition period correctly in 
order to quantify the effect of  the reform on  national savings. As we  have 
stated, the reduction in government savings that takes place during the transi- 
tion could completely offset the increase in private-sector savings channeled 
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it is helpful to review the expenditures and revenues of the state-run social 
security system before the reform and the projections for the transition period 
and for the long run (after the former system ceases to exist). 
a) Prior to the reform, the government was exclusively responsible for all 
pension benefits extended to public- and private-sector employees as well as 
self-employed workers. The government financed these expenditures with pay- 
roll taxes: a 10 percent personal contribution and a 16 percent employer contri- 
bution. Since these revenues were insufficient to fund the system's obligations, 
the government began to use part of the tax revenues collected from income 
taxes, the value-added tax, the asset tax, etc. 
b)  Once the new regime becomes fully operational (i.e., in the long run), the 
government will be responsible only for the payment of the PBUs. To finance 
these expenditures, the government will draw on the employers' contribution, 
which has been reduced in variable percentages depending on the employer's 
geographic location.Io Given that the government will pay only the minimum 
pensions, the public system will generate a surplus if the current level of taxes 
used to finance the system is applied identically in the future. This would allow 
the government to reduce payroll taxes even further in the future, thereby re- 
ducing the distortion that this tax has produced in labor markets. 
c) During the transition, the government must continue to pay the benefits 
generated under the former system. In addition, the government must contrib- 
ute to the financing of benefits that the capitalization regime extends to workers 
who would have received benefits before the reform. Finally, the government 
will be responsible for the pensions of those affiliates who choose to remain 
in the state-run system." To finance the transition period, the government can 
draw on employer payroll taxes and personal contributions of workers who opt 
to remain in the pay-as-you-go system. 
Table 5.11 summarizes the expenditures and revenues of the state-run sys- 
tem. Since, in Argentina, workers are free to choose between the pay-as-you- 
go and the capitalization regimes, the projections on financing the state social 
security system are based on alternative assumptions regarding individual pref- 
erences for the alternative systems. 
Table 5.12 contains the financing projections for the state social security 
system realized by Schulthess and Demarco (1996). 
10. The government reduced  the employer contribution in October  1995 in  response to the 
growth in unemployment observed since 1993. The minimum reduction of 30 percent (equivalent 
to a rate of 11.2 percent of wages) is applied in the most-developed regions of the country, where 
the unemployment problem is less severe. The maximum reduction of  80 percent (equivalent to a 
rate of 3.2 percent) is applied in the least-developed regions. 
11. As we have already argued, even though workers will be free to choose between regimes 
in the future, it is expected that new workers will on the whole find the capitalization regime more 
attractive since it offers comparatively higher benefits than the pay-as-you-go regime for active 
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Table 5.11  Benefits and Revenues of the Public Pension Program 
Benefits  Revenues 
~  ~~  ~~  ~_____ 
Betore the reform  Retirement and pensions of 
public- and private-sector 
employees and qelf-employed 
workers 
During the  Benefits already extended under 
Part of the benefits under 
transition  the former system 
capitalization regime for 
workers who contributed to the 
former system 
Benefits to affiliates of the pay-as- 
you-go regime 
PBU 
Under one unique  PBU 
regime 
~~ 
Personal contributions: 10% of 
wages 
Employer contributions: 16% of 
wages 
Other tax revenues (part of 
value-added and income 
taxes, wealth, etc.) 
Personal contributions of 
workers who opt for the pay- 
as-you-go regime (1  1  % of 
wages) 
Employers contribution (16% of 
wages reduced in most 
regions of the country) 
Other tax revenues 
Employer contribution 
Other earmarked revenues 
The employer’s contribution  reflects  the  reduction  that  was  implemented 
during 1995 when the amount was 16 percent.’* These projections allow us to 
draw the following conclusions. First, there is a significant disequilibrium  in 
the years immediately  following the reform that tends to correct itself  over 
time. In the long term, the deficit becomes a surplus since, under the new sys- 
tem, the government is responsible only for the minimum pensions. 
It is important to point out that a high proportion of the difference is the 
direct result of reduction in employer contributions from 16 to 12 percent, not 
the consequence of the pension reform per se. This reduction is part of a plan to 
lower labor costs by reducing the proportion of public social security financed 
through payroll  taxes. It obviously requires an important reduction in public 
expenditure and a redistribution of public resources from other uses, a process 
that is now taking place but that is still incomplete. 
In essence, the only truly significant issue that emerges from projections of 
a considerable  deficit in the  social security system is how  it is going to be 
financed. Since, in the long term, the deficit becomes a surplus, there is the 
possibility of financing it through issuing debt. In other words, since the long- 
term solvency of the system does not deteriorate (to the contrary), it is possible 
to think of an intergenerational transfer that offsets a large part of the reform’s 
effect on saving. 
12.  This assumes that, at some point during the transition, contribution rates will be increased 
to yield an average of  12 percent, which is higher than current levels. 203  The Shift to a Funded Social Security System in Argentina 
Table 5.12  Projections of Revenues, Expenditures, and the Deficit of the Public 
Pension Regimen (millions of pesos) 
Total  Total 
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Source: Schulthess and Demarco (1996) 
Alternatively, the government could reduce public expenditure, or increase 
tax collections (contributions, transfers, and others), by fighting tax evasion or 
increasing tax rates. The possibility of achieving an increase in total national 
savings (public and private) with this approach is considerably greater. In view 
of the difficulties observed in reducing evasion, an important redistribution of 
public resources to public social security from other uses results in the crucial 
issue of  financing transition without  (or with a low level of) public  indebt- 
edness. 
These alternative instruments could be complemented by some redefinition 
(reduction) in the level of certain public pensions. In fact, some critics oppose 
the high level of basic redistributive pensions (such as the PBU). Since public 
pensions do not adjust automatically, the system does contemplate reductions 
in real terms without the need of a legal amendment if Congress authorizes 
adjustments at a rate lower than the inflation rate. 204  Joaquin Cottani and Gustavo Demarco 
5.4.2  Pension Funds' Projection and the Net Effect on Saving 
Table 5.13 contains  projections  of  retirement  savings under  assumptions 
consistent with those used for the projections presented in table 5.12 above and 
assuming that the rate of  return on the capitalization fund is 4 percent. By 
comparing the two tables, it is possible to conclude that, during the years im- 
mediately following the reform (from 1995 to 1998), private savings channeled 
through the pension funds are less than the dissaving by the public sector that 
is necessary to finance the pay-as-you-go system during the transition. 
We can conclude from the information presented in table 5.13 that, once the 
negative effect of the public deficit has passed (from 1998 on), the social secu- 
rity system will increasingly add to national saving. Projections for 2020 re- 
flect an increase of the savings rate induced by social security reform of about 
2.5 percent of  GDP (almost 15 percent of  the saving rate previous to social 
Table 5.13  Estimate of Total Effect of Pension Funds on Saving 
Millions of Pesos  % of GDP 
Year  Public  Private  Total  Public  Private  Total 
1995  -3,750 
1996  -  3,760 
1997  -3,703 
1998  -3,550 
1999  -3,392 
2000  -3,279 
200 1  -3,055 
2002  -2,863 
2003  -  2,620 
2004  -  2,402 
2005  -2,115 
2006  -  1,885 
2007  -1,616 
2008  -  1,372 
2009  -  1,096 
2010  -872 
201 1  -616 
2012  -414 
2013  -182 
2014  36 
201s  247 
2016  444 
2017  613 
2018  804 
2019  97 1 
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security reform). This proportion would be greater if we introduce more opti- 
mistic assumptions about the evolution of earmarked taxes.I3 
Apart from the magnitude of the effect on saving, a qualitative effect on 
capital market development is expected as a result of the reform. Whereas the 
effect of  private pension plans on the saving rate is a subject of discussion, 
there is practically no doubt regarding its importance in strengthening capital 
markets through the development of long-run investments and the introduction 
of institutional investors. 
In summary, expected long-run effects on saving and the development of 
capital markets appear optimistic if  the government can solve the financial 
problems of the transition. It is difficult to anticipate how the government will 
deal with the transitional period on the basis of its behavior in 1995 when the 
new pension system had been in effect for one full year. The year was excep- 
tional to the extent that the increase in the global fiscal deficit substantially 
exceeded the loss in personal contributions to the pay-as-you-go system. It is 
important to keep in mind that the Argentine economy suffered a tremendous 
confidence shock at the beginning of the year as a result of the Mexican peso 
devaluation, which precipitated a 20 percent reduction in deposits. The exter- 
nal shock produced a sharp recession (GDP fell by 4.4 percent), which led to 
a sharp reduction in fiscal revenues. In the social security system, in spite of 
the increased affiliations that resulted from the reform, the lack of credit and 
the decline in the level of economic activity reduced the system’s revenues 
significantly. At the same time, there was an alarming increase in the expendi- 
tures of  the  social security system during  1994, which demonstrated clearly 
that the problems inherent in the former system persisted even after the reform. 
To offset these effects, the Argentine government implemented very impor- 
tant measures to demonstrate its commitment to increasing national  saving 
through the social security reform. First, it proposed the Ley de Solidaridad 
Previsional, which was approved at the beginning of 1995. The law established 
maximum benefits and limits on the growth in the system’s expenditures, elimi- 
nated definitively the practice of indexation, and established that any increase 
in benefits extended under the pay-as-you-go system would be decided by the 
national Congress, through the approval of  the Annual Budget Law, on the 
basis of the system’s available resources. This signified the guarantee of a true 
pay-as-you-go system. The government also implemented a far-reaching tax 
and pension moratorium, which resulted in nearly $5 billion in debts declared 
by  contributors. The moratorium allowed affiliates of the SIJP and other con- 
tributors to regularize their pension situation after they had postponed contri- 
butions following the tequila effect (Schulthess 1994). 
13.  With an annual 4  percent growth rate in GDP, tax collection should increase by more than 
the proportion assumed in our projections in table 5.12. In  addition, a redistribution of  public 
resources is taking place at present between social security and non-social  security public expen- 
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The Argentine government  anticipates that its operational deficit (without 
including privatization revenues) will be $2.5 billion. This figure is similar to 
the projected flows of contributions to the capitalization regime. Nonetheless, 
in view  of the prevailing  standby agreement with the IMF, the deficit must 
disappear in 1997. In order to comply with this target and maintain it in succes- 
sive years, the pension reform will have a very positive effect on savings re- 
sulting from the government's  commitment to refrain from using debt to fi- 
nance the pension reform. 
References 
Demarco, Gustavo, and Laura Posadas. 1992. Las inequidades en el regimen nacional 
de previsi6n social. Estudios (Fundaci6n Mediteminea)  15, no. 62:61-75. 
Duran, Viviana. 1993. La evasi6n en el sistema de seguridad social de Argentina. In 
Serie politica Jiscal, no. 50. Santiago de Chile: Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
Lo Vuolo, Ruben.  1994. Analisis de la actual situacio'n del mercado de rrabajo y  su 
probableproyeccidn  futura. Buenos Aires: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social. 
Posadas, Laura. 1994. El nuevo sistema de jubilaciones y pensiones y el dCficit previ- 
sional pliblico. In Estudios, vol. 17, no. 68 (January-March). C6rdoba: IEERAL. 
Rofman, Rafael. 1996. Evoluci6n, componentes y efectos de las comisiones del regi- 
men de capitalizaci6n. In Serie estudios especiales, no. 2. Buenos Aires: Superinten- 
dencia de AFJP. 
Rofman, Rafael, and Gustavo Stirparo. 1996. Proyecci6n del tamaiio de 10s  fondos de 
jubilaciones y pensiones. In Serie estudios especiales, no. 4. Buenos Aires: Superin- 
tendencia de AFJP. 
Schulthess, Walter. 1991. Costos y beneficios financieros en el regimen nacional de 
jubilaciones  para personas  en relaci6n de dependencia.  Econo'mica (Universidad 
Nacional de La Plata) 27, nos. 1-2: 115-29. 
. 1994. Antecedentes y fundamentos del anteproyecto de ley de solidaridad pre- 
visional.  Previsidn  social,  vol.  5, no.  16  (October-September).  Buenos  Aires: 
ANSES. 
Schulthess, Walter, and Gustavo Demarco. 1993.  Argentina: Evolucidn del sistema nac- 
ional de previsio'n social y propuesta de reforma. Santiago: Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
. 1994. Reforma previsional en Argentina. Buenos Aires: Abeledo-Perrot. 
. 1996. El financiamiento del regimen previsional p6blico en Argentina despues 
Superintendencia de AFJP.  Various numbers,  1994-97.  Boletin  estadistico  mensual. 
de la reforma. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL. Mimeo. 
Buenos Aires. 
. Various numbers, 1995-97. Memoria trimestral. Buenos Aires. 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. Mimeo. 
Uthoff, Andras.  1995. Promoci6n del ahorro y 10s  sistemas de pensiones. Santiago: 207  The Shift to a Funded Social Security System in Argentina 
Comment  Anita M. Schwarz 
Had I been asked to comment on this paper a year ago, I would have concen- 
trated on some of the technical flaws in the Argentine reform. None of these 
flaws are fatal, but they nonetheless exist and will need to be addressed at some 
time by the government. Over the last year, watching the reform unfold, I have 
become an admirer of the political strategy used in reforming the social secu- 
rity system in Argentina and am convinced that the political economy dimen- 
sions of the reform may be applicable to other countries as well. I devote the 
first part of my comments to the technical flaws and the last part to explaining 
my still favorable view of the reform. 
Technical Flaws 
There are three main technical problems with the newly reformed Argentine 
system. These include issues of long-run sustainability, the parallel operation 
of multiple systems, and, last but not least, evasion. 
Long-Run Sustainability 
In the long run,  the  employer contribution to the  social security  system, 
which is currently  averaging  around  12 percent  of  wage today, is meant to 
finance the basic universal pension  to all individuals of retirement age who 
have contributed for thirty or more years. This basic pension is flat, currently 
set at 27.5 percent of  the economy-wide  average covered wage. In many re- 
spects, this system is quite similar to the British system, but recall that the 
British  flat pension is currently only  15 percent and is expected to fall to 9 
percent in the future, as a result of the decision to fix benefits in real terms. 
The question is whether this level of basic pension can be sustained in the 
future. A simple back-of-the-envelope  calculation, assuming two contributors 
per retiree in the future, suggests that 12  percent of wage can support a pension 
worth only 24 percent of  wage, not 27.5 percent of wage, even if there are no 
administrative costs or disability payments to finance. If the fiscal projections 
shown in table 5.2 were extended  for another  fifteen to twenty  years, they 
themselves would show the system once again running deficits. In fact, longer- 
run projections done by a group at the University of Buenos Aires do show 
deficits in the system beyond 2020, with the surpluses being generated in the 
medium term, peaking around 2013. This is quite different from the cases of 
Mexico or Chile. 
In both Mexico and Chile, the government faces liabilities during the transi- 
tion to a new pension system. Current pensioners and those with accrued rights 
to pensions under the old system have to be paid, while the contributions from 
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current workers are invested in their own individual accounts. However, the 
life spans of  those  with accrued rights to the old system are finite. Subse- 
quently, the only liabilities faced by the governments are contingent liabilities, 
arising from minimum pension guarantees, limited to those who are extremely 
poor or to those with extremely erratic work histories. 
Argentina faces transition  liabilities like these other countries, but it also 
has to finance this public flat pension. There is no question that this flat pension 
allows the system to provide more redistribution and more poverty alleviation 
than the Chilean and Mexican systems, although one could argue that the ex- 
penditures in Argentina are less targeted toward the poor. The critical question 
is whether this level of  redistribution  is optimal and affordable in the long 
run. In pension systems, there is always a trade-off between redistribution and 
providing individuals a reasonable return on their mandated savings. The more 
you redistribute, the lower the rate of return some individuals will receive rela- 
tive to what the market would have provided. This low rate of return increases 
the incentive to evade. 
Reducing the size of this public flat pension and thus the contribution neces- 
sary to finance it relative to the defined-contribution pillar would improve in- 
centives to contribute, provide individuals with a better return on their overall 
contribution, and be more affordable, but still allow positive redistribution. 
Parallel Systems 
A second problem is the parallel operation of a new public pay-as-you-go, 
defined-benefit scheme that operates as an option to the fully funded, defined- 
contribution scheme and is financed by the employee contribution. The parallel 
operation of two schemes is especially troubling because currently individuals 
can go back and forth between the schemes. Eventually, on entry to the labor 
force individuals will choose which scheme is preferred, and, subsequently, 
they can opt for the fully funded scheme, but no one who opts for the fully 
funded scheme can go the other way. 
From a fiscal standpoint,  not only does the Argentine system continue to 
accrue liabilities in its flat, redistributive  pillar, but it is also generating new 
liabilities in this pay-as-you-go, defined-benefit system. Pay-as-you-go systems 
are fiscally sustainable as long as the benefits are defined with regard to future 
declines in the number of contributors. This system is particularly  vulnerable 
since, of the overall number of contributors under the age of thirty, more than 
90 percent have chosen the private system. Since individuals cannot change 
back in the future, the contributor base will dwindle quite rapidly, leaving the 
government to cover the remaining liabilities. 
The operation of  this parallel system has effectively increased the costs of 
transition and increased the duration of  the transition period in Argentina. Ar- 
gentina not only has the normal problem of financing the transition away from 
a pay-as-you-go  system toward  a funded  system but also has the additional 
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pillar to a funded system. And the acquired rights prior to the reform were 
rewarded generously, making the transition in both cases quite costly. 
Evasion 
Evasion  is probably  the most pressing problem  in the Argentine  pension 
system and one that not only plagued the previous system but continues virtu- 
ally unchanged in today’s system. The extent of  this evasion can be seen by 
comparing the demographic support ratio, the number of working age individ- 
uals divided by the number of elderly, with the beneficiary-contributor ratio in 
the system. While the demography suggests a support ratio of 5.86, the system 
shows a support ratio of  only  1.55 contributors per retiree. There are either 
enormous numbers of unreported workers, enormous numbers of excess retir- 
ees, or some combination of the two. By contrast, in countries like the United 
States, the demographic ratio is virtually identical to the system support ratio. 
In fact, on a graph showing the relation between the two for a group of forty- 
two countries for which data are available, Argentina is a clear outlier (World 
Bank 1994, 146). 
Moving  from a public  pay-as-you-go  system to a funded  private  system 
should reduce evasion. Individuals in the funded private system cannot receive 
substantial benefits without contributing. The penalty for not contributing is a 
sizably reduced pension. 
Although Argentina has adopted a funded private pillar, there has not yet 
been a change in evasion. This judgment is not entirely fair in that, six months 
after the reform, a severe recession began and the unemployment rate began to 
skyrocket, which reduced both contributions and contributors, making it diffi- 
cult to measure changes in evasion. But I would argue that some of this lack 
of progress in combating evasion can also be attributed to the system design. 
For starters, the overall payroll tax rate in Argentina is 49 percent. Including 
income taxes and value-added taxes, the tax burden is enormous. Under the 
reform, only 11 percentage points of that 49 percent tax go toward the funded 
system for the people opting for the private system. The remainder is in varying 
degrees a tax, particularly for higher-income people because of the heavy re- 
distributive  element involved. As a result, despite the social security reform, 
there is still a powerful incentive to evade, particularly since payroll taxes are 
collected together with income taxes. The government is aware of this problem 
and is trying to reduce payroll  taxes, but,  in the short run, cutting tax rates 
reduces the contribution revenue, exacerbating fiscal problems. The increased 
fiscal problems make the policy less credible in the long run. As a result, em- 
ployers and employees are not responding to the tax cut, which is perceived 
as transitory. 
Second, the benefit structure is such that the flat, first-tier pension is received 
for only thirty years of contributions, with no benefits at all for anything less 
than thirty years. Take the example of a woman who works from age twenty to 
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reenters at age forty, and retires at the statutory age of sixty-two. She will not 
complete thirty years of contributions, so, even if she contributes, she receives 
nothing in return. In most cases, a spouse’s income may provide the family 
with eligibility for health benefits and family allowances. The only benefit she 
may receive for her 49 percent payroll tax is unemployment  insurance. She 
could self-insure much cheaper than that. 
Similarly, the individual who was in the informal sector when the reform 
began and had already reached the age of forty without formal contributions 
would never have the opportunity to complete thirty years of contributions and 
would thus find that most of the payroll tax would be exactly that, a tax. It is 
no wonder, then, that evasion has not dropped significantly. One way of dealing 
with this problem is to prorate the flat benefit on the basis of the number of 
years of contributions. 
Finally, in Argentina, unlike in Chile, both employers and employees con- 
tribute to most benefit  plans. Both have an incentive to collude by underre- 
porting the number of employees, the number of  hours worked by  each em- 
ployee, and the wages paid because such collusion results in lower taxes for 
both employer and employee. In Chile, by  contrast, only the employees pay. 
The wages of contributors to the new system were increased to compensate for 
the former split payment, but the payment responsibility lies strictly with the 
employee today. Now, employers have no incentive to collude. In fact, given 
that employee wages are tax-reducing  costs, employers have every incentive 
to report  accurately, which makes it much easier for tax authorities to catch 
evading employees. 
Lessons from the Argentine Reform 
Despite  these technical problems, the political economy of the Argentine 
reform  holds lessons for other reforming  countries. Take as an example the 
case of the new parallel system. The architects of the reform did not want a 
parallel  system. They wanted  a new  system with a flat pillar and  a private 
funded pillar. But, politically, it was not possible to force individuals, even new 
employees, into a private pension  system. Insisting on this provision would 
have derailed the entire reform effort. However, now, only two years after the 
reform  was initiated, almost 90 percent of new employees are choosing the 
private system. Within a year, it will be possible to pass a law mandating that 
all new employees join the private  system, without causing political uproar. 
The compromise was costly, but it was a price that had to be paid in order to 
develop public confidence in private pensions and to change a mind-set accus- 
tomed to public pension rights. 
In too many countries, public social security programs have become the third 
rail. Touch them, and you die. Incremental reform, such as what happened in 
Argentina, may be more feasible than a big-bang one-shot reform, particularly 
where the political obstacles to reform outweigh the technical obstacles. Sub- 211  The Shift to a Funded Social Security System in Argentina 
sequent minor adjustments can now take place in an environment where public 
opinion is no longer hostile to private participation in pension provision. These 
minor adjustments will always be necessary  as technical problems arise and 
circumstances change. 
However, the first reform, the introduction of the private funded accounts in 
a  substantive  way,  paves the  way  for all future reform.  In this context, we 
should regard the Argentine reform as a second-best solution that serves as a 
conduit to the first-best solution rather than evaluating it strictly as a final solu- 
tion in its own right. 
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Discussion SUmmary  Jeffrey Liebman and Andrew Samwick 
The discussion began by considering differences between the Argentine and 
the Chilean plans. It was noted that the minimum guarantees are quite different 
in the two countries. In Argentina, all workers  who have contributed to the 
system for thirty  years  or more receive  the  basic universal  pension  (PBU), 
which is equal to about 20 percent of the average wage level in the economy. 
This basic benefit amount is not linked to the individual worker’s earnings his- 
tory and is not reduced if the workers are entitled to additional pensions. Thus, 
there is no distortion from phasing out the pension. However, since all retirees 
receive it, it is not very well targeted. The Chilean plan, in contrast, contains a 
guaranteed minimum that results in a 100 percent tax rate on savings in the 
relevant  range. The participant suggested that some combination of the two 
approaches to the minimum guarantees was likely to be better than either of 
the simple schemes and that it would be helpful to see some simulations on 
this issue. 
Another participant noted that, in Chile, there was no intention of including 
redistribution in the privatized retirement system. He said that, while figuring 
out how to achieve a more equal income distribution was a very important 
problem in Latin America, he doubts that transferring income through retire- 
ment programs is an efficient way to help the poor. 
It was also noted that, while the administrative fees charged by the plans 
in Chile come from additional contributions above the mandatory savings, in 
Argentina they are subtracted from the mandatory contributions. The authors 
explained that having the administrative costs deducted from the mandatory 
payments makes it easier to observe whether the funds are transferred to the 
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The discussion turned to more general evasion issues, and one participant 
reported that a former cabinet minister in Argentina had said that evading taxes 
was Argentina’s national sport. The participant  questioned  whether it made 
sense to have the DGI (Argentina’s IRS) collect the funds for the retirement 
system since it has been shown to be incapable of collecting other tax revenue. 
In response, the author noted  that it is hard to tell whether tax evasion has 
diminished in recent years. Argentina has had a reasonably good measure of 
evasion only since the new retirement system was put into place. Before that, it 
was impossible to determine what was in each individual’s accounts. Moreover, 
unemployment has been very high recently, making comparisons with earlier 
periods difficult. 
A participant  questioned the wisdom of forbidding workers  from moving 
back and forth between the old and the new systems. He said that economists 
generally prefer to influence people by altering the incentives they face rather 
than by mandating particular behavior. He recommended that Argentina should 
arrange the incentives to discourage workers from gaming the system by mov- 
ing back and forth between the old and the new systems (as the United King- 
dom recently has done), rather than forbidding switches. 
Members of the conference expressed surprise at some of the numbers pre- 
sented in the paper. One participant remarked that the rates of returns achieved 
by the plans were very high and wondered whether the rates of return were real 
or nominal. The author explained that the returns are real but that it is very 
difficult to measure the returns achieved by the plans (they are calculated as 
yield to maturity). In addition, interest rates have been very high in Argentina, 
in large part  owing to the tequila effect  (the Mexican  crisis), and that fact 
partially  explains  the  high  rates  of  return.  A  second  participant  inquired 
whether it was really true that 42 percent of workers had retirement accounts 
but were not contributing to them. He also expressed surprise that few workers 
took advantage of the opportunity to make additional voluntary contributions 
to their accounts. The author confirmed the numbers and said that there were 
policies under consideration to encourage additional contributions by adding 
an insurance component to the plan. A third participant noted that the 49 per- 
cent payroll tax rate in Argentina is very high, especially for low-wage workers 
and workers with intermittent attachment to the labor force who would receive 
no marginal retirement benefits from their payments. The author explained that 
the payroll tax funds health  insurance and family allowances in addition to 
retirement benefits, so all workers  get something for their contributions. In 
addition, the high marginal tax rates are falling since the employer contribution 
rate is declining. Health reform might make it possible to reduce this tax rate 
further. 